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Abstract 
 
The proper design of price interventions in energy markets requires consideration of 
equity and efficiency effects. In this paper, budget survey data from 29,000 
Indonesian households are used to estimate a demand system for five energy sources, 
which is identified by the spatial variation in unit values (expenditures divided by 
quantities). We correct for the various quality and measurement error biases that 
result when unit values are used as proxies for market prices. The price elasticities are 
combined with tax and subsidy rates to calculate the marginal social cost of price 
changes for each item. The results suggest that even with high levels of inequality 
aversion there is a case for reducing the large subsidies on kerosene in Indonesia, 
supporting the reforms that have been announced recently.  
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I. Introduction 
 Energy demand is rising rapidly in developing countries. The energy pricing policies of 
those countries are therefore increasingly important to the efficient use of the world’s energy 
supply. Energy markets in some developing countries are highly distorted, especially from 
consumer subsidies (IEA, 1999). For example, the Government of Indonesia spent over US$13 
billion dollars on consumer fuel subsidies in 2005. These subsidies have a major effect on the 
overall energy balance in Indonesia because households account for about 45 percent of total 
energy consumption. There also are large fiscal effects, with about one-quarter of the 
government budget (and about five percent of Indonesian GDP) going on fuel subsidies (Sen and 
Steer, 2005). 
 Dramatic reforms have been attempted by the Indonesian government in response to this 
escalating cost of fuel subsidies. In October 2005 the subsidised price of kerosene was raised 186 
percent, from Rp 700 per litre (US 7 cents) to Rp 2000 per litre (US 19 cents). The prices for 
diesel and gasoline were raised by approximately 90 percent, following on from increases of 30 
percent in March 2005 (Table 1). These earlier price increases did not apply to kerosene. 
Moreover, a timetable has been set for completely phasing out fuel subsidies, with those on 
gasoline and diesel timetabled to go by the end of 2006 and those on kerosene by the end of 
2007. These energy subsidies are meant to be replaced with a set of targeted subsidies, whose 
benefits are to be designed so that they are restricted to low-income groups (Kompas, 2005; 
Jakarta Post, 2005). 
 It is unclear whether these ambitious plans for reform will be realised. The first reason is 
that despite the substantial price rises enacted in 2005, there is still a long way to go if Indonesian 
fuel prices are to be set at world levels. The kerosene price in October 2005 was only 31 percent 
of the world price, while gasoline and diesel prices were about two-thirds of the world level 
(Table 1). The second reason for doubting that these ambitious plans can be achieved is that 
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many previous attempts at reforming energy price policy in Indonesia have failed because of the 
resulting political difficulties. Attempted reforms in 2003 were reversed after widespread protests 
while the price rises in 1998 are believed to have precipitated the downfall of the Suharto regime 
(BBC, 2005; Economist, 2005). Moreover, these subsidies have been long-term features of the 
Indonesian economy, dating back to the mid-1970s (Dick, 1980). The subsidization of especially 
kerosene has been seen as one feasible way of meeting equity objectives, because the poor are 
presumed to use kerosene as their main cooking fuel.2 However there are debates about whether 
the poor are the main beneficiaries of kerosene subsidies (Sumarto and Saryahadi, 2001). Indeed, 
even though there was early evidence that a disproportionate share of the subsidy was being 
captured by richer urban households, the subsidy policy continued to be strengthened and 
kerosene prices were held below one-fifth of the world level as far back as 1980 (Pitt, 1985).  
 The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence to help assess whether the 
proposed reforms of energy price policy in Indonesia are likely to be welfare-enhancing. 
Specifically, the equity and efficiency effects of price changes in the household energy sector are 
analysed. To achieve this aim, the marginal social costs of indirect taxes and subsidies are 
calculated for five fuels and household energy sources: kerosene, gasoline, oil, LPG, and 
electricity. These marginal social costs depend on the rate at which household welfare falls as 
prices increase, and on the rate at which net public revenue rises (Ahmad and Stern, 1984). If a 
reform is optimally designed, the costs in terms of social welfare of the last Rupiah of 
government expenditure saved by cutting subsidies (or raising taxes) on each good should be 
equal. To obtain the two required parameters – the welfare derivative and the revenue derivative 
– information is needed on tax and subsidy rates, consumption patterns, and aggregate demand 
responses. Thus, the analysis follows the recommendation of Newbery (2005) to use the basic 
 
2 This reliance on energy subsidies reflects the limited capacity for income transfers, which is a feature of many 
developing countries. 
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principles of public finance to introduce order into discussions of how energy taxes and subsidies 
might rationally be set. 
 This empirical analysis is needed because the previous literature on energy demand in 
Indonesia does not provide clear guidance for evaluating the subsidy reforms. On the one 
hand, Pitt (1985) concluded that the price of kerosene should be increased on both equity and 
efficiency grounds. In part, this conclusion rested on an estimate from household survey data 
that the elasticity of kerosene demand with respect to its own price was -1.03, suggesting that 
price distortions would create large substitution effects. However, other estimates of the price 
elasticity of demand for kerosene are not nearly so large: Koshal et al. (1999) use time series 
data to estimate a long-run own-price elasticity of demand of only -0.17. If the demand for 
kerosene really is this price inelastic the efficiency losses from the subsidy might be 
evaluated as being less important than the presumed benefits in the form of transfers to the 
poor.3 Consequently, once distributional concerns were taken into account by Yizhaki and 
Lewis (1996) they reached the opposite conclusion to Pitt (1985); specifically, Yitzhaki and 
Lewis concluded that there would be aggregate improvements in welfare from increasing the 
subsidy on kerosene.  
 In addition to providing analysis that can help to assess the recent subsidy reforms in 
Indonesia, a further aim of the paper is to demonstrate how a common source of data in 
developing countries can be used to estimate the matrices of demand elasticities that are 
needed for evaluating energy pricing policies. While there are several time series studies of 
energy demand in developing countries, and specifically Indonesia (Dahl and Kurtubi, 2001; 
Koshal et al. (1999)), these have two major limitations: first, the time series is often very 
short. For example, McRae (1994) uses just 15 annual observations to estimate gasoline 
demand models for Indonesia and several other Asian countries. Second, the growing 
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reliance on targeting means that aggregate elasticities from time series studies may no longer 
be the most relevant ones for assessing pricing interventions. Instead, disaggregated 
elasticities for target groups such as rural households or the poorest quintile of households 
may be needed. 
 Household surveys are one source of data that can be used to calculate disaggregated 
energy demand elasticities, with prices proxied by unit values (expenditures divided by 
quantities) and the identification of demand responses coming from spatial rather than 
temporal variation in prices. Indeed this was the source of data used by Pitt (1985). However, 
there are at least three problems with the use of such data. In contrast to market prices, unit 
values reflect household-specific quality and reporting error effects, and are subject to sample 
selection effects because they are unavailable for non-purchasing households. Deaton (1990) 
shows that ignoring these problems (as Pitt did) is likely to lead to elasticities being too large 
in absolute terms, causing substitution possibilities to be overstated and tending to raise the 
calculated efficiency costs of subsidies.  Therefore, in this paper we use the estimation 
methods developed by Deaton (1990) to correct the biases that result from using unit values 
rather than actual market prices. Our example may help economists elsewhere who are 
considering the use of household survey data for estimating demand responses, particularly in 
the context of developing countries where spatial price variation is greatest and time series 
are typically shortest. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the 
theoretical framework underlying the calculation of the social costs of marginal tax and 
subsidy reform. In Section III, we describe the data and econometric estimation methods used 
in this paper. Particular attention is paid to the method developed by Deaton (1990) for 
estimating price elasticities from household survey data. Section IV presents the estimation 
 
3 Noting again that there is contention about how much of the subsidy is captured by the poor. This issue is 
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results for the disaggregated household energy demand system. Section V looks at the 
implications of the elasticity estimates for the reform of household energy and fuel prices in 
Indonesia. This section also discusses evidence about whether the poor benefit the most from 
kerosene subsidies. Section VI presents our conclusions. 
 
II. The Marginal Tax Reform Approach 
 In an influential paper, Ahmad and Stern (1984) proposed a methodology for evaluating 
marginal tax and subsidy reforms. The crucial parameter of the Ahmad and Stern model is what 
they call the marginal social cost (MSC) of a unit of public revenue. This is made up of two 
components: a welfare derivative and a revenue derivative. Specifically, a decrease in the 
subsidy rate, τi on good i, (or equivalently, a tax increase) will cause welfare to change at rate 
iV τ∂∂ /  and net government revenue to change at rate iR τ∂∂ / . The ratio of these two 
derivatives gives the marginal social cost, iλ  of raising one unit of net revenue (saving one unit 
of expenditures) by decreasing the subsidy rate on good i:  
i
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Goods with low iλ  ratios are those that are candidates for either a tax increase or a subsidy 
reduction. When all the ratios are the same there is no further scope for beneficial reform.  
This approach can be implemented by noting that the welfare derivative (the 
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discussed in the penultimate section of the paper. 
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where wim is the budget share for good i in household m, xm and nm are the total expenditure and 
size of household m, and ε  is the coefficient of inequality aversion.4 A range of values of ε 
between zero (no inequality aversion) and two (a high degree of inequality aversion) are 
commonly used to see whether tax reform recommendations are robust to particular ethical 
judgements (Ahmad and Stern, 1984). In terms of the calculation of equation (2), the larger is 
ε the closer the average budget share will be to budget shares of the poorest households in the 
sample. The second average budget share is the so-called ‘plutocratic budget share’ (Prais, 
1957) which is based on ratios of total expenditure (rather than averages of ratios) and gives 
the biggest weights to the richest households:5 
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 The denominator of the λ-ratio represents the efficiency aspect of tax- and subsidy-
induced price changes. A given price change will produce a larger net revenue effect, the greater 
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The total consumption of the good is shown by iw% , while the substitution effects are shown by 
,kiθ  the derivative of the budget share for good k with respect to the (log) price of good i. The 
tax factor gives the share of tax in the final price. For example, in Indonesia household purchased 
of oil face a VAT rate of 10 percent, so the tax factor is 0.10 (1 0.10) 0.09,+ =  while subsidies 
 
4 Consider judgements about the effect of taking Rp1000 from someone to give some of it to a person with half 
the income and destroying the rest (e.g., due to efficiency losses). When ε=0 the judge would approve of this 
transfer only if the poorer person received all Rp1000. But when ε  takes the values of 1 (or 2) the amount the 
poorer person receives has to be only Rp500 (or Rp250 if ε=2) in order for the resulting distribution to be 
judged as giving the same level of social welfare as before the transfer (Creedy, 1996).  
5 The plutocratic budget share is widely used in Consumer Price Index calculations. According to calculations 
by Deaton (1998a) the “average consumer” according to plutocratic budget shares in the United States was 
located at about the 75th percentile of the distribution of household expenditures. 
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meant that kerosene prices since October 2005 are only 31 percent of the prices in other 
countries, so the tax factor is .23.2)69.01(69.0 =−−   
 The first term of the denominator in equation (4) measures the own-price 
distortionary effect of the tax or subsidy. If it is large and positive, as would be the case for a 
heavily subsidised and price elastic good, the term will contribute to a small iλ and would 
indicate the low social cost of raising net revenue by decreasing the subsidy on this good. 
The last term is the sum of the tax factors multiplied by the cross price elasticities, and 
captures the effects on other goods (and the resulting net revenue changes) from the change 
in the tax on good i. 
 This framework for evaluating marginal reforms can be contrasted with the 
requirements for calculating optimal tax and subsidy rates.  More information is needed to 
calculate optimal tax and subsidy rates because explicit utility functions are needed for agents 
since demand responses have to be evaluated at the optimum, which is a point that may be far 
away from the current position of the economy. Furthermore, estimates have to be made of 
how behavioural responses themselves change in response to taxes and subsidies (Madden, 
1996). 
 
III. Data and Estimation Methods 
Data from the consumption module of the 1999 SUSENAS survey are used for 28,964 
households located on Java.6 Respondents in this survey are asked to recall their expenditures 
over the past month for approximately 300 different products. For food, fuels and electricity 
they are also asked about the quantity purchased so that unit values can be derived. These 
 
6 This household budget survey is only carried out every three years and the 1999 results were the most recent 
when the analysis was begun. Java contains approximately 60 percent of the Indonesian population and, 
economic activity is even more heavily concentrated there, so the results should still be relevant to nationwide 
price reform. 
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unit values are needed because the survey does not collect market prices. The survey’s 
sampling procedure involves selecting clusters of up to sixteen households within census 
enumeration areas. This spatial clustering encourages the assumption that households within 
each cluster face the same prices and this feature is exploited by the estimation method used 
below. 
The five energy products considered – electricity, LPG, kerosene, gasoline and oil – 
contribute almost 4.4 percent of the average household budget, ranging from LPG at 0.14 percent 
to electricity at 1.82 percent (Table 2).7 The first three columns of Table 2 describe some of the 
characteristics of the unit values. Items like electricity and kerosene have unit values available 
for almost every household while information for items like LPG and gasoline is less readily 
available. Means of unit values are also shown in the table. These are computed from those 
households who make market purchases of the commodity under consideration. On average, 
consumers in 1999 paid approximately Rp. 460 per litre for kerosene, while gasoline and oil cost 
more than Rp. 1,000 per litre. The mean prices of these energy products vary somewhat by 
location, with rural households paying a slightly higher price than urban households for all of the 
commodities except oil, perhaps because of high transport costs in rural areas (Appendix Tables 
1a and 1b). The coefficient of variation indicates the degree of heterogeneity within each group, 
which is least for commodities like kerosene and gasoline where there is little quality variation.  
The procedure used to get the price responses that are needed for the marginal social cost 
calculations starts with a two-equation system of budget shares (wGic ) and unit values (vGic) that 
are both functions of the unobserved prices, (pHc ): 
)5(lnln ) u + f( + p    + z   + x   =  = w 0 c iG cG c HHG 
N
=1H
c i
0
Gc i
0
G
0
Gc iG θγβα ∑⋅  
 
 
7 While gasoline and oil can also be considered as transport fuels they are widely used in the household sector 
to power domestic generators, and in fact are more widely consumed than LPG, especially in the rural sector. 
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)6(lnlnln u + p    + z   + x   =  = v 1 c iG c HHG 
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the G indicates goods, i indicates households and the c indexes clusters. Amongst the 
explanatory variables, xi is total expenditure of household i, pH are the unobserved prices, zi 
is a vector of other household characteristics,  fGc is a cluster fixed-effect in the budget share 
for good G  and u0 c iG  and u1 c iG  are idiosyncratic errors. The estimation proceeds in three 
stages, which are discussed fully in Deaton (1997). 
 In the first stage, the procedure removes the household-specific effects of income and 
other demographic characteristics from the budget shares and unit values.  To do so, 
equations (5) and (6) are estimated using OLS, where in addition to xi and zi, the specification 
also controls for all cluster fixed effects, including those of unobserved prices, so that the 
1100 and,,, GGGG γβγβ  parameters can be estimated consistently, even in the absence of market 
price data.  These four parameters are used to create adjusted budget shares and unit values 
that have the quality effects due to income and other factors removed. For example, if richer 
households buy higher grade gasoline (which will have a higher unit value) the first stage 
regression can account for this and the adjusted unit value is more like a price because prices 
should not vary across households in the same community. 
 The first stage regressions also produce the residuals that are needed in the second 
stage for estimating the covariances that are used to correct for the effect of any measurement 
error in unit values and budget shares.  The error terms, 10 and GicGic ee , from equations (5) and 
(6) contain all the variability in wGc and vGc that are not explained by x, z, or the cluster fixed 
effects. Assuming a single price per cluster, the unexplained variation around the cluster 
mean can indicate measurement error.  
 In the second stage of the Deaton procedure, a between-clusters errors-in-variables 
regression is applied to the (adjusted) average budget shares and unit values, which have 
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been purged of household characteristics at the first stage.  If it were not for the effect of 
prices on cluster-wide quality variation, the parameters estimated at the second stage would 
be sufficient for calculating the price responses. Instead, a separability theory of quality 
(Deaton 1988) has to be used to identify the price effects at the third and final stage. Full 
details of the estimation method can be found in Deaton (1997). 
 One feature of the procedure is that the budget share equation (5) is unlike Tobit-style 
models in that it pays no special attention to non-purchasing households, who have budget 
shares of zero. Since the revenue effect of a tax increase does not depend on whether demand 
changes take place at the extensive or intensive margins, when studying tax and revenue 
reform one needs to include all households, whether they purchase or not (Deaton, 1990). 
Therefore, equation (5) is simply viewed as a linear approximation to the regression function 
of the budget share conditional on the right-hand-side variables, averaging over both zeros 
and non-zeros in much the same way that an aggregate demand function does (Deaton, 
1997).8 
 
IV. Econometric Results 
Table 3 contains results from the first stage (within-cluster) estimation of the budget 
share and unit value equations. The coefficients reported are for the effects of log total 
expenditures on budget shares, β0 and on log unit values, β1 plus summary statistics for each 
equation. The tables also include the elasticity of quantity demanded with respect to total 
expenditures, which depends on coefficients from both the budget share and unit value 
equations.9 The other (unreported) variables used at the first stage include (log) household 
size, a set of demographic variables (the number of household members in each of thirteen 
 
8 Other studies applying Deaton’s method to household survey data also follow the same specification and 
include households with budget shares of zero. See, for example, Nicita (2004). 
9 See equation 5.36 of Deaton (1997) for a derivation. 
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age and sex categories as a ratio of household size), and nine educational dummies. These 
variables are based on those used by Deaton (1990) in his study of food demand from the 
same survey in an earlier year. As can be seen from Table 3, the first stage estimation of the 
budget share equations explains from 27 percent of the variation for oil to 47 percent for 
kerosene. More of the variation in unit values is explained, ranging from 31 percent for 
gasoline to 66 percent for oil. 
LPG, gasoline and oil attract positive 0β coefficients – indicating luxury goods whose 
expenditure elasticities are greater than one, and whose budget shares will rise more than 
proportionally as household expenditure rises.  The total expenditure elasticity for kerosene is 
0.44, which is consistent with the estimates made by Pitt (1985) and Yitzhaki and Lewis 
(1996), indicating that kerosene is a necessity.10 Appendix Tables 2a and 2b show that rural 
households tend to have higher expenditure elasticities than urban households. For instance, 
rural households have expenditure elasticities of 3.08 and 4.08 for gasoline and LPG 
compared with 2.38 and 2.36 for urban households. These results imply that rural households 
are likely to have larger proportionate increases in demand for these products as their income 
rises.  
The quality elasticities, 1β are estimated from the effect of changes in the logarithm 
of total expenditure on the log of the unit value. These show how unit values differ between 
rich and poor households in the same communities, where this variation is presumed to 
reflect the purchase of higher quality commodities by the rich. Yet according to the estimates 
shown in column 5 of Table 3, with the exception of kerosene and oil, all of the quality 
elasticities are negative although none are very large. Thus, rather than richer households 
paying more per unit they pay less, presumably because of bulk purchases or more favourable 
 
10 In developed countries, kerosene has been found to be an inferior good (Kennedy, 1974). A plausible 
explanation for this is that in developed countries, other energy sources are used for cooking and lighting.  
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electricity tariffs for these households than are available to the poor. However, the magnitude 
of these effects is small, and it is only for the unit value of oil, where the quality elasticity is 
0.07, that there would appear to be any significant within-cluster variation in unit values. The 
small size of these quality effects is consistent with other studies using the Deaton method 
and is also intuitively sensible because the quality variation within a household energy source 
is likely to be less than that within a food group (e.g. steak versus hamburger). Therefore it is 
the ability of this method to also mitigate the effect of measurement error in unit values that 
becomes its crucial feature (Deaton, 1997). 
Table 4 contains the estimated own- and cross-price elasticities for Java. The 
symmetry restrictions from demand theory have been imposed on these estimates in order to 
improve precision of the estimates. In addition to the five energy sources, there is an extra 
row and column for “all other goods”, the estimates for which are obtained from the 
homogeneity and adding-up restrictions. The elasticities are conditional not only on 
household size and the dummy variables for household characteristics mentioned above, but 
also on a set of province and urban dummy variables.11  
In addition to the price elasticities, the table also include bootstrapped estimates of 
“standard errors”. To calculate these standard errors, 1000 random draws are taken from the 
second stage data (i.e., the cluster average budget shares and unit values, after the effect of 
household total expenditures and other characteristics have been controlled for). For each of 
these random draws, all of the elasticities are recalculated, in effect creating 1000 versions of 
Table 4. The length of the interval around the mean of each bootstrapped elasticity that 
contains 68.3 percent of the bootstrap replications is calculated and one-half of this interval is 
used as the estimate of the standard error. The rationale is that if the distribution of the 
 
11 It is not possible to add them at the first (within-cluster) stage because the cluster fixed effects would 
obliterate them. 
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elasticity estimates was normal, 0.683 is the fraction of a normal random variable within two 
standard deviations of the mean (Deaton, 1997).  
The own-price effects are well determined as are several cross-price effects. All of the 
estimated own-price elasticities are negative, as they should be. The estimated own-price 
elasticity of demand for kerosene in Java is found to be -0.96 (with a standard error of 0.11). 
Disaggregating this result, the demand for kerosene appears considerably more price elastic 
in rural areas than in urban areas, possibly reflecting the lower incomes of the rural 
population. Specifically, a 10 percent increase in the price of kerosene will bring about a 13.3 
percent decline in the quantity of kerosene bought by the rural households, but only 6.4 
percent decline in the urban sector (Appendix Tables 3a and 3b). These are close to the 
estimates obtained by Pitt (1985) who also used household survey data, but did not correct 
for the possible biases caused by unit values. The similarity of elasticity estimates, and the 
contrasts with the much more inelastic time series estimates, suggests that Pitt’s conclusion 
that it would be both equitable and efficient to reduce the subsidy on kerosene may in fact 
have been correct.  
The own-price elasticities are also large (in absolute terms) for electricity and LPG, 
although only the one for electricity is precisely estimated. This suggests that subsidies will 
have caused a considerable amount of substitution into these products.  Amongst the cross-
price elasticities, the demand for electricity, LPG, gasoline and oil with respect to the price of 
kerosene is negative, and in some cases, large in absolute value. This apparent 
complementarity may reflect the limited but specialized use of these energy sources by 
Indonesian households, who use electricity mainly for lighting, while they use LPG mainly 
for cooking.   
Even with the spatial price variation provided by 1900 clusters, and with the 
imposition of theoretical symmetry restrictions, a majority of the cross-price effects are 
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imprecisely estimated. Possibly more success would come from using a sample from all 
regions of Indonesia, because of the greater impact of transport costs in causing relative price 
differences, but expanding the sample would also bring the risk of greater uncontrolled 
heterogeneity. 
 
V. Marginal Social Cost Calculations 
Table 5 shows the efficiency effects of cutting subsidies (or raising taxes) on each of 
the goods, distinguishing between the terms in the denominator of the marginal social cost 
formula (equation (4)). The first column shows the tax factors (calculated from comparison 
of the world and domestic prices), while the second column shows the own price elasticities 
of quality and quantity together. The product of the first and second columns, which is shown 
as the third column, gives the own-good contributions to the tax distortion that would be 
caused by a marginal increase in price. As can be seen from the table, the own effects for 
these energy products are reasonably small, with the exception of kerosene and electricity, 
for whom raising prices would save the largest amount from the subsidy budget (ignoring any 
cross-price effects). With regard these cross-price effects, they are largest for gasoline and 
LPG.  According to the combined results in the last column of Table 5, and noting that 
nothing yet has been said about distributional issues, kerosene and then LPG are the most 
attractive candidates for price rises.  
In Table 6, the results of bringing in the equity effects are reported for a range of the 
distributional parameter, ε. The first two columns are for 0=ε , where there are no 
distributional concerns; the cost-benefit ratios are simply the reciprocals of the last column in 
Table 5 and give the same ranking in terms of relative marginal social costs as was given by 
the revenue derivatives. The marginal cost of raising kerosene prices is lowest, and for 
raising oil prices (which are already taxed) is highest amongst the energy sources. However, 
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all of the λi for the energy sources are much lower than for “other consumption” indicating 
the general desirability of removing all energy subsidies.  
As we move across to the right-hand side of Table 6, and the ε  parameter increases, the 
equity columns give larger values to the goods most heavily consumed by the poor and relatively 
smaller values to those consumed by households that are better off. For 0.5ε = , kerosene 
receives the highest social weight, with ww ~ε  greater than unity. Consequently, as ε  increases 
further, kerosene loses its place as the most attractive candidate for a price rise, becoming the 
second most attractive when ε = 1 and the third most attractive when ε = 2. Indeed, with an 
inequality aversion parameter of ε = 2 the lowest social cost of reduced government expenditure 
(or equivalently additional revenue) would come from raising LPG prices, followed by raising 
gasoline prices. The best candidate for a subsidy at these higher inequality aversion levels is 
electricity.  
When the results are disaggregated into the rural and urban sector the recommendations 
are largely the same. In the rural sector kerosene is the best candidate for price increases when 
inequality aversion levels are low, with LPG becoming the best candidate at higher inequality 
aversion levels (Appendix Table 5b). Electricity and gasoline appear to be best candidates for 
any price subsidy in rural areas, as these commodities attracts the highest λi  ratios. In the urban 
sector LPG is consistently ranked as the commodity with the lowest social cost of price 
increases and the attractiveness of raising kerosene prices diminishes with the degree of 
inequality aversion that is assumed. 
The results suggest that at low levels of inequality aversion kerosene is the best 
candidate for reduced subsidies but that there may be some reluctance by policy makers who 
are more inequality averse to cut kerosene subsidies. Given this possible ambiguity over the 
recommended policy reform, additional evidence on household kerosene use may be useful. 
Table 7 reports for each sector (rural and urban) and each quintile of the household 
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expenditure distribution, the average quantity of kerosene consumed, the kerosene budget 
share and the proportion of households who use kerosene stoves.  
 While kerosene does have a larger share of the budgets of poor households, the 
difference is only marked in comparison to the richest quintile of households. Indeed, in the 
rural sector, the budget share is almost constant (at 1.4 percent) across the first four quintiles. 
The results in the table also show that it is not true that kerosene is predominantly the fuel of 
the poor. In rural areas there is a monotonic increase in the proportion of households using 
kerosene stoves and in the consumption level of kerosene when moving from poorer to richer 
quintiles. In urban areas the three middle quintiles all have higher rates of kerosene stove 
usage than the poorest quintile and the consumption level of kerosene is roughly constant 
across quintiles. Thus, a majority of the kerosene subsidies will not be captured by the poor, 
especially in rural areas, and the replacement of energy subsidies with targeted income 
subsidies is likely to be both more efficient and more equitable. 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have used household budget survey data from Indonesia to estimate the 
marginal social cost of indirect taxes and subsidies on five household energy sources. 
Regardless of assumptions about inequality aversion, all of these energy sources are 
attractive candidates for price increases, when compared with the social cost of revenue 
raised from taxes on other goods and services. The calculations also show that reducing 
expenditure on subsidies by allowing further increases in the consumer price of kerosene 
would be desirable, taking into account both efficiency and equity.  Thus the suggested 
directions of reform are in line with the actual price reforms carried out in 2005, and they 
indicate the desirability of furthering these reforms.  
 17
The motivation for these reforms in Indonesia has been the heavy cost of maintaining 
consumer energy subsidies as world energy prices soar. There are likely to be other 
developing countries facing a similar set of issues. From a methodological point of view, the 
availability of household survey data in other developing countries suggests that similar 
analyses could be carried out in settings where price elasticity estimates are needed to 
evaluate the effects of price distortions in consumer energy markets.  
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Table 1. Recent Changes in Regulated Fuel Products Prices, Rupiah per litre and percentage 
change (percent of world price) 
 Jan 2003-Feb 2005 Mar-Sep 2005 October 2005 onwards 
  
Price 
 
Price 
% change 
from Feb 05 
 
Price 
% change 
from Mar 05 
% change 
from Feb 05 
Gasoline 1,810 
(36%) 
 
2,400 
(56%) 
33% 4,500 
(68%) 
88% 149% 
Kerosene 
(household) 
700 
(11%) 
 
700 
(11%) 
0% 2,000 
(31%) 
186% 186% 
Automotive 
Diesel 
1,650 
(33%) 
 
2,100 
(45%) 
27% 4,300 
(68%) 
105% 161% 
Source: World Bank (2005) 
 
 
 
 Table 2. Commodities, Sample Sizes and Budget Shares for Java, 1999  
 
Commodities 
Number of 
households with 
unit values 
(a) 
Mean 
unit value 
(b) 
Coefficient 
of variation 
of unit value 
(c) 
Number of 
clusters with 
unit values 
(d) 
Number of 
households in 
clusters in (d) 
  (e) 
Percentage 
shares of total 
expenditure 
(f) 
 
Electricity 26,536 191.475 0.684 1,817 26,952 1.816 
LPG 2,321 1,346.07 0.189 650 2,334 0.142 
Kerosene 23,677 456.074 0.160 1,846 23,967 1.470 
Gasoline 5,735 1,014.38 0.094 1,430 5,784 0.735 
Oil 3,698 1,056.44 0.617 1,430 5,238 0.199 
Note: (a) is the number of households with a well-defined unit value, which equals the number of purchasing  
               households minus those who report in irregular units. 
          (b) in Rupiah. 
 
 
Table 3. First Stage Estimates: Effect of Total Expenditures on Quantity and Quality for Java   
 Budget Share Equation  Unit Value Equation  
Commodities oβ  )( ot β  R2 1β  )( 1βt  R2 ε  
Electricity -0.0003 -1.320 0.313 -0.0302 -4.460 0.593 1.104 
LPG 0.0025 25.660 0.310 -0.0150 -0.950 0.500 2.740 
Kerosene -0.0083 -36.790 0.467 0.0004 0.110 0.344 0.435 
Gasoline 0.0123 37.600 0.326 -0.0121 -1.600 0.312 2.691 
Oil 0.0037 28.020 0.273 0.0745 3.580 0.661 2.800 
Note: oβ is the derivative of the budget share with respect to log total expenditures, 1β  is the derivative of the (log) unit 
value with respect to log total expenditures (a.k.a. the ‘quality elasticity’),  R2 is for the budget share and unit value 
regressions,  and ε  is the expenditure elasticity of quantity. 
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 Table 4.   Symmetry Constrained Estimates of Own and Cross Price Elasticities for Java, 1999 
  Electricity LPG Kerosene Gasoline Oil Other Cons 
Electricity     -1.043 -0.006 -0.081 -0.068 -0.025 0.239 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) 
LPG -0.108 -0.321 -0.226 -6.017 -0.260 4.207 
  (0.21) (0.89) (0.97) (4.42) (0.30) (3.51) 
Kerosene -0.073 -0.015 -0.960 -0.406 -0.059 1.160 
  (0.03) (0.08) (0.11) (0.26) (0.04) (0.22) 
Gasoline -0.198 -1.164 -1.030 -0.080 0.214 -0.421 
  (0.13) (0.85) (0.65) (1.28) (0.15) (0.87) 
Oil -0.262 -0.186 -0.570 0.791 -0.382 -2.265 
  (0.15) (0.21) (0.32) (0.54) (0.14) (0.67) 
Other Cons -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 -0.263 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.37) 
 Note: Standard error in ( ); Results for “All Other Goods” derived from  homogeneity and adding  up    
           restriction. 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Efficiency Aspects of Price Reform in Java with Symmetry Restriction 
Commodities 
i
i
τ
τ
+1  1~ −i
i
w
θ  Own effect Cross effects Total 
Electricity -1.60 -1.05 1.69 0.38 3.06 
LPG -0.43 -0.63 0.27 3.26 4.53 
Kerosene -3.18 -1.61 5.11 0.81 6.92 
Gasoline -0.95 0.00 0.00 2.70 3.70 
Oil 0.09 -0.59 -0.05 1.08 2.02 
Other consumption 0.09 -0.97 -0.09 -0.10 0.81 
 
 
Table 6. Equity Effects and Cost-Benefit Ratios for Price Reform in Java with Symmetry 
Restrictions 
  0=ε   5.0=ε   1=ε   2=ε  
Commodities ww ~ε  λ  ww ~ε  λ  ww ~ε  λ  ww ~ε  λ  
Electricity 1.00 0.33 0.95 0.31 0.91 0.30 0.85 0.28 
LPG 1.00 0.22 0.78 0.17 0.58 0.13 0.29 0.06 
Kerosene 1.00 0.14 1.11 0.16 1.17 0.17 1.19 0.17 
Gasoline 1.00 0.27 0.82 0.22 0.67 0.18 0.47 0.13 
Oil 1.00 0.49 0.79 0.39 0.64 0.32 0.44 0.22 
Other consumption 1.00 1.23 1.00 1.23 1.01 1.24 1.01 1.24 
 
Table 7. Kerosene Consumption, Budget Shares and Kerosene Stove Use 
 Budget share (%) Quantity (litre/month) Kerosene Stove Use 
Quintile Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
1 (= poorest) 1.40 2.44 2.82 6.16 0.19 0.58 
2 1.38 2.18 3.13 5.79 0.29 0.62 
3 1.34 2.03 3.41 6.01 0.37 0.78 
4 1.36 1.73 4.16 5.97 0.45 0.75 
5 (=richest) 0.99 0.92 4.29 4.53 0.53 0.53 
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Appendix Table 1a. Commodities, Sample Sizes and Budget Shares for Urban Java, 1999  
 
Commodities 
Number of 
households with 
unit values 
(a) 
Mean 
unit value 
(b) 
Coefficient 
of variation 
of unit value 
(c) 
Number of 
clusters with 
unit values 
(d) 
Number of 
households in 
clusters in (d) 
  (e) 
Percentage 
shares of total 
expenditure 
(f) 
 
Electricity 12,305 182.738 0.667 829 12,018 2.05 
LPG 2,088 1,344.86 0.185 527 1,706 0.28 
Kerosene 10,371 444.335 0.155 823 10,338 1.62 
Gasoline 3,531 1,005.72 0.082 729 3,103 1.01 
Oil 2,206 1,070.15 0.620 582 2,739 0.25 
Note: See Table 2. 
 
Appendix Table 1b. Commodities, Sample Sizes and Budget Shares for Rural Java, 1999  
 
Commodities 
Number of 
households with 
unit values 
(a) 
Mean 
unit value 
(b) 
Coefficient 
of variation 
of unit value 
(c) 
Number of 
clusters with 
unit values 
(d) 
Number of 
households in 
clusters in (d) 
  (e) 
Percentage 
shares of total 
expenditure 
(f) 
 
Electricity 14,231 199.029 0.693 988 14,574 1.63 
LPG 233 1,356.88 0.225 123 627 0.03 
Kerosene 13,306 465.224 0.161 1,023 13,616 1.35 
Gasoline 2,204 1,028.26 0.109 701 2,676 0.52 
Oil 1,492 1,036.18 0.613 567 2,493 0.16 
Note: See Table 2. 
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Appendix Table 2a. First Stage Estimates: Effect of Total Expenditures on Quantity and Quality for 
Urban Java   
 Budget Share Equation  Unit Value Equation  
Commodities oβ  )( ot β  R2 1β  )( 1βt  R2 ε  
Electricity 0.001 2.120 0.275 -0.005 -0.620 0.612 1.042 
LPG 0.004 20.980 0.301 -0.012 -0.740 0.478 2.358 
Kerosene -0.013 -42.970 0.494 0.004 0.770 0.323 0.218 
Gasoline 0.014 26.460 0.340 -0.012 -1.450 0.304 2.382 
Oil 0.004 18.480 0.320 0.074 2.880 0.655 2.427 
Note: See Table 3. 
 
 
Appendix Table 2b. First Stage Estimates: Effect of Total Expenditures on Quantity and Quality 
for Rural Java   
 Budget Share Equation  Unit Value Equation  
Commodities oβ  )( ot β  R2 1β  )( 1βt  R2 ε  
Electricity -0.002 -6.140 0.342 -0.058 -5.570 0.577 0.952 
LPG 0.001 12.660 0.226 -0.357 -0.350 0.666 4.076 
Kerosene -0.004 -11.510 0.471 -0.003 -0.490 0.346 0.718 
Gasoline 0.011 26.150 0.286 -0.003 -0.200 0.341 3.080 
Oil 0.004 20.890 0.209 0.053 1.470 0.677 3.271 
Note: See Table 3. 
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Appendix Table 3a.   Symmetry Constrained Estimates of Own and Cross Price Elasticities for 
Urban Java, 1999 
  Electricity LPG Kerosene Gasoline Oil Other Cons 
Electricity -0.990 -0.014 -0.011 -0.073 0.008 0.043 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.08) 
LPG -0.128 -0.365 0.126 -3.213 -0.106 1.340 
  (0.14) (0.62) (0.67) (1.69) (0.19) (1.87) 
Kerosene 0.003 0.027 -0.635 0.005 -0.034 0.416 
  (0.04) (0.11) (0.18) (0.16) (0.04) (0.29) 
Gasoline -0.175 -0.894 -0.027   -0.868 0.234 -0.640 
  (0.11) (0.47) (0.26) (0.23) (0.14) (0.62) 
Oil 0.039 -0.119 -0.260 0.942 -0.372 -2.731 
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.28) (0.55) (0.16) (0.71) 
Other Cons -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.274 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.35) 
 Note: See Table 4 
  
 
 
Appendix Table 3b.   Symmetry Constrained Estimates of Own and Cross Price Elasticities for 
Rural Java, 1999 
  Electricity LPG Kerosene Gasoline Oil Other Cons 
Electricity -1.108 -0.029 -0.132 0.000 -0.065 0.439 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.00) (0.02) (0.08) 
LPG -1.493 -1.616 -5.008 0.000 0.118 3.960 
  (2.13) (2.85) (8.91) (0.18) (1.92) (10.51) 
Kerosene -0.157 -0.119 -1.331 0.000 -0.168 1.059 
  (0.07) (0.21) (0.25) (0.00) (0.09) (0.36) 
Gasoline -0.036 0.000 -0.032 -1.000 0.000 -2.010 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (1.09) (0.00) (1.02) 
Oil -0.707* 0.024 -1.460 0.000 -0.489 -0.692 
  (0.21) (0.39) (0.77) (0.00) (0.20) (0.92) 
Other Cons -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.264 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.26) 
 Note: See Table 4 
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Appendix Table 4a.  Efficiency Aspects of Price Reform in Urban Java with 
Symmetry Restriction 
Commodities 
i
i
τ
τ
+1  1~ −i
i
w
θ  Own effect Cross effects Total 
Electricity -1.60 -0.99 1.58 0.08 2.66 
LPG -0.43 -0.35 0.15 2.53 3.68 
Kerosene -3.18 -0.53 1.68 0.07 2.75 
Gasoline -0.95 -0.89 0.84 0.48 2.32 
Oil 0.09 -0.53 -0.05 -0.10 0.85 
Other consumption 0.09 -1.00 -0.09 -0.02 0.89 
 
 
Appendix Table 4b.  Efficiency Aspects of Price Reform in Rural  Java with Symmetry 
Restriction 
 
Commodities 
i
i
τ
τ
+1  1~ −i
i
w
θ  Own effect Cross effects Total 
Electricity -1.60 -1.09 1.74 0.33 3.07 
LPG -0.43 -1.07 0.46 2.07 3.53 
Kerosene -3.18 -1.36 4.33 0.25 5.59 
Gasoline -0.95 -1.00 0.95 0.00 1.95 
Oil 0.09 -0.75 -0.07 2.62 3.55 
Other consumption 0.09 -0.99 -0.09 -0.05 0.86 
 
 
Appendix Table 5a.  Equity Effects and Cost-Benefit Ratios for Price Reform in Urban Java 
with Symmetry Restrictions 
  0=ε   5.0=ε   1=ε   2=ε  
Commodities ww ~ε  λ  ww ~ε  λ  ww ~ε  λ  ww ~ε  λ  
Electricity 1.00 0.38 0.95 0.36 0.91 0.34 0.85 0.32 
LPG 1.00 0.27 0.78 0.21 0.58 0.16 0.29 0.08 
Kerosene 1.00 0.36 1.11 0.40 1.17 0.42 1.19 0.43 
Gasoline 1.00 0.43 0.82 0.35 0.67 0.29 0.47 0.20 
Oil 1.00 1.17 0.79 0.92 0.64 0.75 0.44 0.51 
Other consumption 1.00 1.13 1.00 1.13 1.01 1.13 1.01 1.14 
 
 
Appendix Table 5b. Equity Effects and Cost-Benefit Ratios for Price Reform in Rural Java with 
Symmetry Restrictions 
  0=ε   5.0=ε   1=ε   2=ε  
Commodities ww ~ε  λ  ww ~ε  λ  ww ~ε  λ  ww ~ε  λ  
Electricity 1.00 0.33 0.95 0.31 0.91 0.30 0.85 0.28 
LPG 1.00 0.28 0.78 0.22 0.58 0.16 0.29 0.08 
Kerosene 1.00 0.18 1.11 0.20 1.17 0.21 1.19 0.21 
Gasoline 1.00 0.51 0.82 0.42 0.67 0.34 0.47 0.24 
Lubricant Oil 1.00 0.28 0.79 0.22 0.64 0.18 0.44 0.12 
Other consumption 1.00 1.16 1.00 1.17 1.01 1.17 1.01 1.18 
 
 
